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Lately I have been ruminating on a particular one of St. Thomas Aquinas' proofs for the existence of God: the First Cause, also called the Uncaused Cause. I once met an undergraduate in a beginning philosophy class who declared this proof to be self-contradictory: if every effect has a cause, then there cannot be an uncaused cause. I don't think she understood what Aquinas meant. I'm not sure I do either, but here is what I do understand:
The natural world can be defined as that which we perceive with our senses. In the natural world, it can be observed that every event results from some other event; i.e. there is a cause for every effect. Therefore, there exists a chain of causality stretching an unknown time before the present.
However, since every natural effect has a cause, this chain cannot be infinite. Therefore, there must exist some uncaused cause to start the chain, also known as the first cause. I will call it Tuc (for the uncaused cause). Tuc cannot be a part of the natural world because all things in the natural world have a cause. Therefore, Tuc exists in an "extranatural" world.
Because Tuc's world allows phenomena to be agents (causes) while being free from the restriction of having causes, it is in a sense superior to the natural world. Tuc's world can therefore be described as "supernatural," or above the natural. (Whew, got rid of that neologism!)
We also observe that phenhomena have as their cause either an event arising from natural laws, or an agent with free will. While there is debate as to whether free will really exists in the natural world, at the least it can be conceived of as an alternative to a mindless natural event.
By definition, natural events are subject to natural law, and therefore they all have causes. By definition, Tuc does not have a cause. Therefore, Tuc is not a natural event. Therefore, Tuc must instead be an agent with free will.
If the universe is always and consistently rational, then a mindless phenomenon cannot be free. It must be subject to rational laws. A phenomenon with free will must therefore have a mind. Therefore, Tuc has a mind, i.e., Tuc is a person.
Christians happen to identify Tuc as the same being as God. They don't just conjure God up as a cop-out explanation for the mysteries of nature; they arrive at the conclusion through a deductive process. It is also my favorite logical proof for God's existence.
This line of reasoning absolutely depends on the assumption that the universe is rational and consistent. Since you can't prove a negative, this is not a proven statement. (But without it, there is no point in using reason to learn about the universe anyway.) It also depends on the definition of the natural world as the set of all things we perceive with the senses, and only those things. (And it does not strictly define "senses.")
What other unproven assumptions, if any, do you think this argument has? Do you feel the reasoning is flawed at any point? Leave your thoughts in a comment below!
PermalinkPosted on August 24, 2009 13:20 by Carl | Carl's home page |
Posted on September 11, 2009 11:24 by James S Saint |
Posted on February 08, 2010 23:04 by Me_5 |
Posted on February 09, 2010 20:27 by Raymond Pagan |
Comment #1 Permalink
"However, since every natural effect has a cause, this chain cannot be infinite."That part of the argument never made sense to me. Why can't it be an infinite regressing chain? However, I once heard the argument phrased somewhat differently, in D'Souza's book What's So Great about Christianity?. He talked about how the chain of causation itself had to have a cause, and that cause had to be outside the chain. It made a little more sense to me that way.
However, I think my biggest problem with arguments like this is that they rest on the assumption that our understanding of concepts like cause and effect, time and the universe, is exact. If instead, our understanding of these concepts is only approximate, then such a line of logic cannot be a compelling proof, but at most a convincing theorem.
Posted on August 12, 2009 22:33 by Anna | Anna's home page |